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Does Political Reservation Affect Voting Behavior? 
Empirical Evidence from India
1 




Using microdata from the National Election Study of the 2004 parliamentary elections 
in India, we empirically examine the impact of political reservation for disadvantaged 
castes and tribes on voting behavior. We find that in a reserved constituency, where only 
members of the disadvantaged castes can stand for election, voters of the disadvantaged 
castes are encouraged to vote. On the other hand, the system of constituency reservation 
does not have any impact on the turnout of voters belonging to other groups, including 
relatively upper caste voters. These voters, however, tend to change political party to 
vote for in reserved constituencies. These findings imply that there is a general 
acceptance of political reservation in the Indian electoral system. 
Keywords: political reservation, voter turnout, castes, India 
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1. Introduction 
Affirmative action is an important element in public policies for enhancing the 
welfares of disadvantaged groups, such as women and racial/religious minorities. 
Several countries have introduced procedures in their political systems to guarantee the 
representation of specific groups in the legislature.
3  India, where the hierarchical caste 
system has led to the economic deprivation of lower castes or tribes, has adopted 
affirmative action in the form of reserving seats in electoral constituencies since 1950. 
Constituencies in both federal and state legislatures are reserved for Scheduled Castes 
(SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). In these reserved constituencies, only candidates 
belonging to the reserved groups can stand for election while the entire electorate votes, 
regardless of their social group. Political reservation has been extended to other social 
groups and to lower levels of public administration in recent years. While such 
reservations are expected to increase the political consciousness of minorities, it 
changes the nature of political competition and impinges on the freedom and choices of 
majorities. It is therefore an important question to examine the impact of political 
reservation on voting behavior. 
There is an emerging empirical literature on the impact of mandated political 
3  The quota system for women in parliaments is currently employed in more than 30 countries 
(World Bank 2001). 
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reservation on policy making in India in the last ten years. Pande (2003) demonstrates 
that the reservation of seats for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in the state 
assembly increased the targeted transfers to disadvantaged groups. Chattopadhyay and 
Duflo (2004) use village council data from West Bengal and Rajasthan and show that 
the reservation of one third of the village council head positions for women had a 
positive impact on public investment in infrastructure that is directly relevant to the 
needs of women. Duflo (2005) reviews the studies on political reservation, concluding 
that there is a significant reallocation of public goods in favor of the group in power. In 
a more recent paper, Iyer et al. (2010) show that political reservation for women in 
village councils contributed to an increase in the reporting of crimes against women. 
In contrast to these studies on the impact of political reservation on policy 
making, there is a dearth of empirical studies on how political reservation in India 
affects political participation. 
4  The effect of political reservation on political 
participation could be different depending on voter characteristics. On one hand, while 
the reservation for disadvantaged castes is likely to encourage voters belonging to the 
same caste groups to participate in the elections, it discourages other voters who may 
quietly boycott the elections. On the other hand, when voters not belonging to the 
4  See Washington (2006) for a related study on US politics. She shows that black candidates 






reserved category form the majority in a reserved constituency, candidates need to 
appeal to them to win the election. The question as to which effect dominates is an 
empirical one whose evidence is lacking in the case of India. Thus, this paper focuses 
on the voter turnout among disadvantaged and other groups to study the impact of 
political reservation on voting behavior. 
The empirical strategy used in this paper takes advantage of microdata of 
voters collected as part of the National Election Study 2004 (NES04), which is the most 
comprehensive survey on elections in India. An assessment of the reservation effect on 
voter turnout requires an estimation of the group-wise differences between voter turnout 
in a reserved constituency and that in a non-reserved (or general) constituency. To 
identify the causal effect of political reservation, we need to minimize bias due to 
omitted variables that vary across constituencies and affect voter turnout. The main 
identification strategy used in this paper is based on the regression-discontinuity design. 
The idea is that we compare constituencies where the population share of the 
disadvantaged group is barely less than the threshold for a reserved constituency on the 
one hand and constituencies where the population share of the disadvantaged group is 
barely more than the threshold. In other words, this is the first study on the causal 









                                                  
   
identified empirical models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
institutional background of political reservation in India. Section 3 discusses why the 
political reservation affects voting behavior. Section 4 explains the data and the 
methodology. Section 5 shows the results of the empirical analysis. The final section 
concludes. 
2. Institutional Background 
Since 1950, the Constitution of India has introduced several affirmative-action 
provisions to improve the social and economic conditions of disadvantaged groups. 
These provisions guarantee them seats in the national legislature called Lok Sabha 
(henceforth referred to as ‘parliament’ to indicate this legislature), in state legislatures 
called the State Assembly (referred to as ‘assembly’ below), and in village Panchayats, 
quotas in educational institutions, and posts in a certain proportion of government jobs. 
Articles 341 and 342 of the Constitution include a list of castes and tribes entitled to 
such provisions, which are referred to as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
5 The 
lists of SCs and STs (commonly referred as SC/STs) have been modified over the years. 










According to the 2001 Population Census, the SC/ST population constitutes 
approximately 16% and 8% of the Indian population, respectively. Article 332 of the 
Indian Constitution provides for political reservation in the parliamentary and assembly 
elections for SC/STs. In a constituency reserved for SCs (called ‘SC constituency’ in the 
following sections), only individuals belonging to a caste included in the list of SCs can 
stand for election. Similarly, in a constituency reserved for STs (called ‘ST constituency’ 
below), only individuals belonging to a tribe included in the list of STs can stand for 
election. In both SC and ST constituencies, the entire electorate casts its vote regardless 
of the individual caste and tribal affiliations. 
The procedure for determining reserved parliamentary constituencies is as 
follows. First, the number of reserved seats is assigned to a state according to the 
population of SC/STs in the state. Second, within the state, the status of SC/ST 
constituency is allocated according to their population share. Third, in the case of SC 
constituencies, the final status is adjusted so that the reserved constituencies are 
spatially dispersed within the state. The share of population is, therefore, the most 
important decisive variable on whether a constituency is reserved or not, but the 
assignment is fuzzy due to the consideration of spatial dispersal (a fuzzy regression 






Because the SC population is widely spread within a state, these voters are a 
minority population in every constituency, irrespective of its reservation status. At the 
same time, ST voters live in geographic isolation, making them the majority population 
in roughly half the constituencies reserved in their favor (Galanter 1984). 
Despite the affirmative action, the disparity in the living standards between 
SC/ST households and other households remains stark. For example, Kurosaki (2011) 
uses microdata on the consumption expenditures in the 61
st NSS (2004/05) and shows 
that the poverty head count index among SC households was 43.8% and that among ST 
households was 37.9%, much higher than that among non-SC/STs households. At the 
same time, this figure was 17.0% for OBCs (Other Backward Classes). He also shows 
that the within-group inequality was substantial among SC and ST households, which is 
consistent with the view that the benefits of the affirmative action have been distributed 
unequally within the disadvantaged group. 
3. Why Do Reserved Constituencies Affect Voting Behavior? 
To support our empirical models, this section briefly surveys the theoretical 
literature on a rational citizen’s decision to vote or not. A rational citizen considers the 








elected and when the opponent wins. According to probabilistic voting models 
(Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; Coughlin 1992; Persson and Tabellini 2000), the voter’s 
utility is a function of ideology and policy. In India, caste ideology has been especially 
important in politics (Osborn 2001). Consequently, SC constituencies increase the 
turnout of SC voters by increasing their ideology-driven utility and decrease the turnout 
of non-SC voters by decreasing their ideology-driven utility since they have to cast their 
vote among lower caste candidates. However, if we take into account the cost of voting, 
the prediction could be that the political reservation through the ideology route may 
decrease the turnout of both groups since the individual’s participation does not affect 
the results; that is, no matter what, the winner belongs to SCs. 
On the other hand, if a voter considers not only ideology but also policy, 
non-SC voters might be encouraged to vote in a SC constituency through the following 
mechanism. Since non-SC voters are usually the majority in a SC constituency, SC 
candidates need to appeal to non-SC voters to win the election. For example, when the 
competition in a SC constituency is between a SC candidate who accommodates with 
the interests of the majority and another SC candidate who caters to the SC residents, 
the difference between the utility if the former candidate wins and if the latter candidate 




   
 
                                                  
   
 
encouraged to vote in a SC constituency than in a general constituency. Both SC and 
non-SC voters can, therefore, be encouraged to vote in reserved constituencies. 
There are explanations other than those based on probabilistic voting models 
that predict the relationship between reservation and voter turnout. For example, 
political reservation may raise the SC/ST turnout owing to an increase in knowledge or 
focus on the elections.
6  In reserved constituencies, the press and political parties may 
give more attention to policies focused on SC/STs. 
In summary, how the political reservation affects the turnout of SC, ST, and 
other voters is theoretically ambiguous. This paper, therefore, empirically investigates 
how the political reservation affects voter turnout. 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Data 
Our main data source is the National Election Study 2004 (NES04) conducted 
by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS). It offers the largest and 
most comprehensive election database in India. Microdata on approximately 27,000 
voters spread across 420 randomly selected parliamentary constituencies are available 
6  Banerjee et al. (2010) show that the campaign with information on qualifications of candidates and 







for our analysis. A sample of voters was interviewed after the 2004 parliamentary 
elections on their voting behavior, political opinion, and background. Variables at hand 
include voting behavior (turnout and party to vote), region (parliamentary and assembly 
constituencies), caste (SC, ST, OBC, or others), and religion (Hindu, Muslim, or others). 
Similar to voting surveys in other countries (Silver et al. 1986), NES04 also 
suffers from the problem of overreporting, that is, while the turnout rate released by the 
Election Commission of India is 58.1%, the turnout calculated by NES04 is 87.2%. 
Given this magnitude of over-reporting, we need to investigate whether the use of 
NES04 microdata enables us a reliable test for the difference in voting behavior among 
different groups of voters. As shown by Hausman et al. (1998), the misclassification in 
the dependent variable results in a bias on the regression coefficients but the extent of 
the bias is proportional across all explanatory variables if the misclassification 
probability is independent of the explanatory variables. If the extent of the bias is 
proportional across all explanatory variables, the test for the difference in voting 
behavior among different groups of voters remains valid, even with the existence of 
overreporting. Therefore, we run a regression model with the constituency-level turnout 
rate as the dependent variable and variables used in our empirical analysis as the 









                                                  
     
   
 
have a statistically significant coefficient, confirming the econometric validity of our 
analysis using the NES04 microdata. 
To control for other demographic variables that are likely to have an effect on 
voter turnout, in the regression, we use the literacy rate, the population share of the rural 
population, SCs (STs), and workers in ten industrial categories. Data on these variables 
are not available at the constituency level. Therefore, we compiled this from the 1991 
Population Census. Since the boundaries of the census districts are different from those 
of the constituencies, we generated constituency-level data from census information 
using weights based on the share each constituency occupies in each of census districts.
7 
4.2. Methodology 
The fundamental identification problem in generating an unbiased estimate for 
a causal effect of reservation on voting behavior arises from the likelihood that whether 
or not a voter goes for elections in a given constituency can be affected by unobserved 
characteristics, which may be correlated with the reservation status (endogeneity 
problem). To deal with this endogeneity issue, our main strategy is to use a 
regression-discontinuity (RD) design since the dichotomous treatment – reservation 
7  This methodology was used by Banerjee and Somanathan (2007). Since the weight provided by 
Rohini Somanathan is only for the 1991 Census, we use the 1991 Population Census. We thank 





   
 
 
   
 
 
   
 
status – is a deterministic function of a single and observable variable, the SC/ST 
population share. The idea is that we compare non-SC (non-ST) constituencies where 
the population share of the disadvantaged group is barely less than the threshold for a 
reserved constituency on the one hand and SC (ST) constituencies where the population 
share of the disadvantaged group is barely more than the threshold. 
The RD model for the SC reservation impact is described as follows: 
Yi
k = f
k(Zp | Dp = 0)*(1 - Dp) + g
k(Zp | Dp = 1)*Dp + Xp β
k + Statep
k + εi
k ,  (1) 
where superscript k denotes the group affiliation of voter i (e.g. a SC voter, non-SC 
voter, OBC voter) and Yi is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if voter i went 
to vote. Dp is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if constituency p where 
voter i resides is designated as a SC constituency. Zp is the population share of SCs in 
constituency p. f(.) is a continuous function that flexibly controls for constituency-level 
unobservables when the constituency is a SC constituency and g(.) is a similar function 
when the constituency is not a SC constituency. Xp represents demographic variables 
(the literacy rate, the population share of rural citizens, the occupational shares), whose 












By testing the statistical difference of f(.) and g(.) at the threshold point of Zp where the 
probability of Dp = 1 goes up discontinuously, we can test the causal effect of 
reservation on voter turnout. In the context of U.S. House elections, Lee (2008) shows 
that this strategy provides quasi-random variation from which the RD impact can be 
properly identified. 
Because our sample size is not large in the vicinity of the threshold point, we 
follow the empirical strategy adopted by Ferreira and Gyourko (2009) in analyzing U.S. 
mayor elections. Thus, we use the entire sample and employ a parametric approach in 
specifying functions f(.) and g(.) as a polynomial up to the third order. Furthermore, if 
the coefficients on the linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of Zp are the same between the 
two functions, the RD impact is reduced to coefficient bd
k in the following specification: 
Yi
k = b0 
k + bd
kDp + b1 
kZp + b2 
kZp 
2 + b3 
kZp 
3 + Xp β
k + Statep
k + εi
k ,  (2) 
where b’s are coefficients to be estimated. Models in equations (1) and (2) are applied to 
voters excluding those in ST constituencies. These voters are classified into SC and 
non-SC voters so that separate regressions are implemented. The category of non-SC 








   
                                                  
 
 
Hindu voters are distinguished.
8  These two sub-categories are picked up from non-SC 
voters because we expect they might hesitate to vote for lower caste candidates given 
that they form the majority in almost all constituencies and belong to relatively higher 
castes. 
To examine the impact of ST reservation on voter turnout, equations (1) and (2) 
are adjusted slightly and applied to voters, excluding those in SC constituencies. 
Namely, Dp is now a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if constituency p is 
designated as a ST constituency and Zp is the population share of STs in constituency p. 
There are two potential problems in applying the RD approach. First, the 
forcing variable, Zp (the population share of SCs/STs in constituency p), is measured 
with error. We compiled Zp from the population census data at the district level, as 
mentioned in the previous subsection. For robustness check with respect to this 
measurement error, we also use the SC/ST shares calculated from the NES04 microdata. 
Second, the relation between the forcing variable and the treatment (Dp) is 
fuzzy due to institutional reasons as well. As mentioned in Section 2, the spatial 
dispersal is also considered in assigning the reservation status to a constituency. The 
identifying assumption under a fuzzy RD design is that the assignment of reservations is 
8Other Hindu is defined as Hindu voters other than SCs and OBCs voters. They represent relatively 












random around the threshold. We assume that this assumption holds. 
Considering these potential problems, we also estimate the causal effect of 
reservation through the difference-in-difference (DID) approach as a method for a 
robustness check. The DID model for the SC reservation is: 
Yi = b0 + b1Dp + b2Di + bdDp Di + Xp β + Statep + εi ,  (3) 
where  b’s are coefficients to be estimated, Dp is the dummy variable for a SC 
constituency and Di is the dummy variable for a SC voter. Since b1 controls the 
unobservable common to all SC constituencies and b2 controls the unobservable 
common to all SC voters, the DID coefficient bd shows the causal impact of SC 
reservation on the turnout of SC voters. The DID approach identifies the effect of SC 
reservation on SC voters using the response of non-SC voters as a reference so that we 
cannot identify separately the effects of SC reservation on SC and non-SC voters. This 









                                                  
   
         
           
 
5. Results 
5.1. Political reservation and turnout 
Excluding the union territory, we use 20,938 voters spread over 393 parliament 
constituencies (60 SC, 33 ST, and 300 general constituencies) in 19 states for regression 
analysis. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics. While the sample shares of SCs and 
STs in the table are 14.7% and 9.9% respectively, the population shares of SCs and STs, 
according to the 2001 Census, are 16.4% and 7.9% respectively. We regard the NES04 
sample to be reasonably representative of the Indian population. 
Since we are not able to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the 
linear, quadratic, and cubic terms of Zp are the same between function f(.) and g(.) in 
equation (1),
9  the RD results based on equation (2) are reported in Table 2. The 
coefficients for the SC/ST constituency dummies are multiplied by hundred for easy 
interpretation.
10  Column (1) in Table 2(a) indicates that SC voters are encouraged to 
vote in a SC constituency with the turnout rate of SC voters in a SC constituency is 
4.524 percentage points higher than the turnout rate of SC voters in a general 
constituency. The difference is not only statistically significant but also politically 
9  For the specification of (1) in Table 2(a), F statistics for the null hypothesis was 1.28 with p-value 
of 0.28, and for the specification of (1) in Table 2(b), F statistics was 0.17 with p-value of 0.90. 








significant – 4.5 percentage points compared with the national turnout rate of 58.1% in 
the 2004 parliament election. 
As can be seen in column (2), the turnout rate of non-SC voters in a SC 
constituency is slightly less than that in a general constituency although the difference is 
statistically insignificant. Examining the possibility of a heterogeneous response among 
non-SC voters, columns (3) and (4) show the impact of SC reservations on ‘other Hindu’ 
and OBC voters. Both the coefficients on the SC constituency dummy are small and 
statistically insignificant. These findings imply that non-SCs voters are not discouraged 
to vote in a SC constituency, suggesting a general acceptance of political reservation in 
the Indian electoral system. 
Table 2(b) shows the RD results for the impact of ST reservation. As shown in 
column (1), the estimated coefficient on the ST constituency dummy is small and 
statistically insignificant. Columns (2)–(4) demonstrate that the turnout rates of non-ST, 
other Hindu, and OBC voters in a ST constituency are not significantly different from 
their turnout rates in a general constituency either. 
These results that are based on the RD approach are further confirmed by a 
robustness check that uses the DID approach. As shown in columns (1) and (2) in Table 










                                                  
   
 
     
Therefore, the turnout rate of SC voters in a SC constituency is 5.23 percentage points 
higher than that in a general constituency. All other cross terms have insignificant 
coefficients. 
Both RD and DID results robustly demonstrate that SC voters are encouraged 
to vote in a SC constituency while non-SC voters are neither encouraged nor 
discouraged by reservations for SCs. On the other hand, voters are not affected much by 
ST reservation.
11  One of the reasons that we cannot find a significant impact of ST 
reservations on voter turnout could be the smaller number of ST voters/constituencies 
and the spatial concentration of ST voters in such fewer constituencies. Another reason 
could be the lack of political cooperation among ST voters. According to Mehta and 
Shepherd (2006), the reasons for the lack of political voice for STs could be many, 
including a fractured ethnicity and lack of leadership. Since statistically significant 
results are not obtained regarding the impact of political reservations for STs, the 
subsequent analyses are limited to the impact of SC reservations. 
5.2. Political reservation and habit forming 
Given that we found that SC reservation increases SC voters’ turnout robustly 
11  Apart from a robustness check, we also re-estimated the RD model using the sample share of 
SC/STs in a constituency compiled from NES04, instead of that based on the census data. The results 








in the parliamentary elections, could we expect the impact to be sustained if reservations 
for SCs were abolished? As is often the case with affirmative action, reservation is not a 
permanent system and is expected to be withdrawn should the day come when there is 
no political discrimination against disadvantaged groups. Therefore, it is also important 
to examine how voters in reserved constituencies change their behavior if the political 
reservation is abolished. It is of course difficult to directly test the effect of a withdrawal 
of affirmative action since it is not politically easy to end the reservation system. 
However, it is possible to test this indirectly, which is the theme of this subsection. What 
follows is an investigation into this issue indirectly using the spatial configuration of SC 
reservation in the state legislative assembly. 
Since there has been little change in the reservation status of the targeted 
constituencies since 1977, the analysis in the previous subsection cannot accurately 
distinguish whether the positive impact on SC voters is permanent (sustainable in the 
event of de-reservation) or contingent on the reservation in force (not sustainable in the 
event of de-reservation). As Gerber (2003) shows, voting is habit forming. Therefore, it 
is possible that SC voters in reserved constituencies have developed a habit of voting, 
resulting in a permanent impact. Another possibility is that in reserved constituencies, 








SC voters has been increased. Yadav (1999) demonstrates that, since the 1990s, the 
number of SC voters who attend election meetings and join the party membership have 
increased. Therefore, in this subsection, we investigate whether in a general 
constituency for the parliamentary elections, the turnout rate of SC voters who have 
experienced a reserved constituency in the assembly elections is higher than that of SC 
voters who have never experienced the reservation. 
Several assembly constituencies are comprised in one parliamentary 
constituency. The assignment of reserved constituencies for the assembly elections is 
determined independently from that for the parliament. There are, therefore, voters who 
belong to a SC constituency for the assembly elections while belonging to a general 
constituency for the parliament elections. Using this variation, we can identify the 
indirect effects of the experiment of reserved constituencies in the assembly elections on 
voter turnout in the parliament elections. 
The empirical model under the RD approach is a slightly revised version of 
equation (2) applied to a part of SC voters. Instead of using all SC voters excluding 
those in ST constituencies (column (1), Table 2(a)), we now restrict the sample to SC 
voters residing in a general constituency for the parliamentary elections. Then Dp  is 








                                                  
   
         
population share in the assembly constituency calculated from the NES04 data and the 
term Xp β
k + Statep
k is replaced by the parliamentary constituency fixed effects.
12 Now, 
the RD parameter bd
k shows the difference in voting behavior between those SC voters 
who have experienced SC reservation and those who have not. If the parameter is 
positive, it indicates a habit-forming effect. 
The results are shown in Table 4. Both the RD parameters bd
k are negative, 
showing the absence of a habit-forming effect. The coefficients are statistically 
insignificant in both columns (1) and (2). Since these are our favorite specifications, we 
conclude that the impacts of political reservation are not long-term but tentative. 
The negative RD coefficient in Table 4 appears to suggest that once a SC voter 
experiences voting in a SC constituency (in the state assembly election), he/she is 
discouraged to vote in a general constituency (in the parliament election). This 
discouragement effect could be explained by a rational voter’s behavior with 
ideology-driven utility and fixed voting cost as follows. A SC voter in a SC assembly 
constituency and a general parliament constituency compares the benefits of voting in 
the state assembly election and the national parliamentary elections. Based on the 
comparative benefits, he/she finds the former more attractive, reducing the probability 
12  Other demographic variable (Xp) cannot be controlled since there is no mapping information to 









of voting in the parliamentary elections. 
The discouragement effect is also suggested by the DID results reported in 
Table 5. Equation (3) is extended to include a dummy variable Dp
’ for SC constituency 
in the state assembly elections and the coefficient on the cross term of Di and Dp
’ 
identifies the DID effect. The coefficients are around -7 percentage points and 
statistically significant. 
These results robustly suggest the absence of a habit-forming effect connecting 
the SC reservations in the state assembly elections to the voting behavior for the 
parliamentary elections. On the contrary, a discouragement effect is suggested. Although 
not conclusive, our results suggest a possibility that the positive effects of SC 
reservation on SC voters’ turnout will disappear once the reservation is withdrawn. 
5.3. Political reservation and party choice 
Both our RD and DID results suggested that the turnout rate of non-SC voters 
in a SC constituency was not statistically different from that in a general constituency 
(subsection 5.1). However, this does not imply that political reservation does not affect 
the voting behavior of non-SC voters at all. This subsection examines another aspect of 










As discussed in Section 3, when the competition in a SC constituency is 
between a SC candidate who accommodates the interests of the majority and another SC 
candidate who caters to the SC residents, a non-SC voter (and especially an upper caste 
voter) is more likely to vote for the former. In other words, upper caste voters in an SC 
constituency have stronger incentive to cast their vote in favor of the political party that 
stands for upper castes than upper caste voters in a general constituency. We thus 
compare the voter’s choice of a political party in a SC constituency and that in a general 
constituency. If the difference is significant, it shows the effect of political reservation 
on party choice. 
To simplify the analysis, we focus on three parties: Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), and Indian National Congress (INC). BSP is a national 
party mainly supported by SC voters, while BJP’s political support is more from among 
the upper castes. INC supporters are more widely spread across social groups. At the 
same time, the BSP’s geographical coverage is more limited than that of the BJP and 
INC. 
We use a multinomial logit model to investigate the effect of political 
reservation on party choice. Both RD and DID specifications are attempted. The 





   
 
 
and others. The explanatory variables are the same as those used in subsection 5.1. The 
constituencies used in regressions are limited to those in which all three parties fielded 
their candidates. ST constituencies are excluded from the analysis. Our final sample 
thus constitutes of 9,292 voters (1,553 SC and 7,739 non-SC voters). 
RD results are shown in Table 6. Since the base party is the BJP, a positive 
(negative) coefficient implies that being in a SC constituency increases (decreases) the 
likelihood that a voter casts his/her vote in favor of the INC, BSP, or other parties, 
relative to the BJP. By taking the exponential of the coefficient, we can obtain the 
relative risk ratio with the choice of BJP as the reference at unity. All the RD 
coefficients among SC voters are small and statistically insignificant (column (1)). This 
result indicates that the party choice of SC voters in a SC constituency is statistically not 
different from that in a general constituency. 
In contrast, the RD coefficient among non-SC voters to choose the BSP relative 
to the BJP is negative and statistically significant (column (2)). As shown in columns (3) 
and (4), most of this negative effect is attributable to the party choice by other Hindu 
voters. This finding appears to suggest that non-SC voters in a SC constituency, 









   
 
 
                                                  
   
 
   
 
     
   
DID results
13  reported in Table 7 are not very different from the RD results. 
For SC voters, choosing a party to vote is not affected by the reservation status of their 
constituency, while the same choice of other Hindu voters turns largely against the BSP 
if the constituency is reserved for SCs. However, the latter effect is not statistically 
significant at the conventional level. 
This subsection has shown that non-SC voters changed their party choice under 
the condition of SC reservation. In this sense, political reservation affects the voting 
behavior of non-SC voters. Extending the analysis of party choice to include other 
parties and incorporating detailed party alliance relations is left for further research. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper is the first attempt to quantify how voters belonging to different 
social groups respond to political affirmative action with respect to voting behavior. 
Using microdata on voters in an election survey in India, we found several relations 
unknown in literature. First, political reservation increases the turnout of SC voters in 
parliamentary constituencies reserved for SCs. This finding indicates that the 
13  DID multinomial regression results confirm our expectations regarding the general tendency of 
each group in choosing the political party to vote. Coefficients on the voter’s group identity 
dummies show that SC voters are more likely to vote for BSP, other Hindu voters are more likely to 
vote for BJP and less for BSP, and OBC voters are more likely to vote for BJP. Since this paper is 
mainly interested in whether such general tendencies change according to the status of reservation, 




reservation not only guarantees parliamentary representation but also promotes the mass 
participation of disadvantaged classes. Second, non-SC voters, including relatively 
higher caste voters, are not discouraged to vote in SC constituencies but change their 
vote for the political parties. This implies that they quietly accept political reservation in 
the Indian electoral system. Third, within non-reserved parliamentary constituencies, the 
turnout rate of SC voters in a SC-reserved state assembly constituency is not larger than 
in a non-reserved assembly constituency. The last finding may suggest that the positive 
impact of SC reservation on the turnout rate of SC voters is likely to disappear if 
reservation is withdrawn. These findings therefore clarify how the electoral reservation 
in India affects voting behavior. They provide useful information to other developing 
countries with ethnic or religious diversity on how upper caste voters accommodate the 
political reservations system. 
However, there are several limitations to generalize our findings. First, the 
effect of political reservation on voting behavior at lower levels (such as local councils 
and state assemblies) may be different from the effects witnessed at the national 
parliamentary level. Since the function and size of governance are different, depending 
on the level of councils, the utility function of the voter may be also different. Second, 







parliamentary constituencies, we cannot derive a firm conclusion on the changes in 
electorate behavior. The dynamics of changes in voting behavior using previous election 
surveys is another area for additional extended research. Exploring these issues is left 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean  St.  Dev  Minimum  Maximum 
Voter-level variables: 
Dummy for turnout  0.872  0.334  0  1 
Dummy for SC voter  0.147  0.354  0  1 
Dummy for ST voter  0.099  0.298  0  1 
Dummy for other Hindu voter  0.244  0.430  0  1 
Dummy for OBC voter  0.326  0.469  0  1 
Constituency-level variables: 
Dummy for SC constituency  0.156  0.362  0  1 
Dummy for ST constituency  0.086  0.280  0  1 
Population share of rural residents  0.772  0.161  0  0.995 
Population share of SCs  0.159  0.070  0.020  0.380 
Population share of STs  0.093  0.141  0  0.703 
Literacy  rate  0.433 0.136 0.184 0.851 
Population share by industry: 
Cultivators 0.141  0.062 0.000 0.322 
Agricultural  laborers  0.085 0.056 0.000 0.546 
Livestock 0.009  0.015  0.000  0.110 
Mining & quarrying  0.002  0.005  0.000  0.065 
Household  industry  0.007 0.007 0.001 0.069 
Manufacturing  0.024 0.022 0.002 0.122 
Construction  0.007 0.004 0.001 0.027 
Trade & commerce  0.024  0.012  0.007  0.097 
Transport, storage, & 
0.009 0.006 0.001 0.039 
communicate. 
Other  services  0.034 0.013 0.004 0.097 
Notes: The number of observations is 20,938. This table reports the simple average (standard 
deviation) of 20,938 sample voters. Voter-level variables are compiled from the NES04 








       
   
       
     
     
     
   
       




   
       
   
     
       
   
 
 
     
 
Table 2. Political Reservation and Voter Turnout, 2004 Parliamentary Elections 
(Regression Discontinuity: RD) 
(a) SC Reservation and Voter Turnout 
Voter’s category:  SC  Non-SC  Other Hindu  OBC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
SC constituency dummy  4.524+  -0.741  -0.836  -0.906 
[2.304] [1.361] [2.156] [1.821] 
Population share of SCs  2.508  -0.003  0.337  -0.952 
[1.904] [0.793] [1.304] [1.184] 
Square of population share  -14.335 -0.495  -0.621  3.538 
of SCs  [10.016] [4.604]  [7.697]  [7.118] 
Cube of population share  22.128 -0.362 -1.723 -5.441 
of SCs  [16.023] [7.780] [13.800]  [12.890] 
Number of observations  2,920  16,218  4,912  6,457 
R-squared  0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 
(b) ST Reservation and Voter Turnout 
Voter’s category:  ST  Non-ST  Other Hindu  OBC 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
ST constituency dummy  0.824  -2.738  -3.117  -5.018 
[4.331] [2.553] [4.135] [3.817] 
Population share of STs  -0.771  -0.363  -0.606+  -0.432 
[0.559] [0.224] [0.362] [0.317] 
Square of population share  3.054 1.300 2.007 1.873 
of STs  [1.852] [0.999] [1.653] [1.347] 
Cube of population share  -2.876+ -0.991  -1.513  -1.723 
of STs  [1.700] [1.091] [1.996] [1.369] 
Number of observations  1,899  15,781  4,342  5,856 
R-squared  0.05 0.02 0.03 0.03 
Notes: RD coefficients to identify the reservation impact are shown in bold fonts. The 
dependent variable is the dummy for turnout in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the parliamentary constituency level are reported in brackets. **, * 
and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Regressions 
include state fixed effects, the literacy rate, the population share of rural residents, and the 
population share of workers in each industrial category. In part (a), sample voters in ST 










   
     
    
         
   
         
    
         
    
         
    
         
     
         
      
       
     
         
     
       
      
         
      
 




Table 3. Political Reservation and Voter Turnout, 2004 Parliamentary Elections 
(Difference-in-Difference: DID) 
(a) SC Reservation  (b) ST Reservation 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
SC constituency dummy -0.825  -0.815
 [1.390]  [2.049] 
ST constituency dummy  -2.094  -0.652 
[2.653]  [2.663] 
SC voter dummy  -0.617  -0.672
 [0.893]  [1.101] 
ST voter dummy  -1.425  -1.501 
[1.417]  [1.454] 
Other Hindu voter dummy  0.029  0.064 
[0.982]  [0.852] 
OBC voter dummy  -0.149  -0.221 
[0.900]  [0.771] 
SC const. * SC voter dummy  5.234**  5.230* 
[2.009] [2.459] 
ST const. * ST voter dummy  2.192  0.620 
[2.859]  [3.206] 
SC const. * other Hindu dummy  0.112 
[2.530] 
SC const. * OBC voter dummy  -0.124
 [2.677] 
ST const. * other Hindu dummy  -0.844 
[2.707] 
ST const.* OBC voter dummy  -3.222 
[2.254] 
Number of observations  19,138  19,138  17,680  17,680 
R-squared  0.020 0.020  0.020  0.020 
Notes: DID coefficients to identify the reservation impact are shown in bold fonts. The 
dependent variable is the dummy for turnout in the 2004 parliamentary elections. Robust 
standard errors clustered at the parliament constituency level are reported in brackets. **, * and 
+ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. Regressions include 
state fixed effects, the literacy rate, the population share of rural residents, and the population 
share of workers in each industrial category. In part (a), sample voters in ST constituencies are 






   
 







Table 4. Political Reservation in Assembly Elections and Voter Turnout in the 2004 
Parliamentary Elections (Regression Discontinuity: RD) 
(1) (2) 
Dummy for a SC constituency in the  -5.763 -4.607 
assembly election  [3.327] [3.428] 
Parliament constituency fixed effect  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.004  0.213 
Notes: RD coefficients to identify the reservation impact are reported in this table. Regressions 
also include the population share of SCs (linear, quadratic, and cubic terms). The dependent 
variable is the dummy for turnout in the 2004 parliament election. Robust standard errors 
clustered at the state assembly constituency level are reported in brackets. **, *, and + denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The population share of SCs 
at the state assembly constituency level was calculated from the NES04 microdata. Since the 
sample is restricted to voters in a general constituency in the national parliament election, the 





     
   
 









Table 5. Political Reservation in Assembly Election and Voter Turnout in the 2004 
Parliament Election (Difference-in-Difference: DID) 
(1) (2) 
SC const. in assembly elect. *SC voters  -6.267*  -7.209* 
[2.640]  [2.860] 
Parliament constituency fixed effect  No  Yes 
R-squared 0.002  0.076 
Notes: DID coefficients to identify the reservation impact are reported in this table. Regressions 
also include the dummy for a SC constituency in the state assembly election, the dummy for a 
SC constituency in the parliament election, the dummy for a SC voter, and three cross terms of 
these three dummy variables. The dependent variable is the dummy for turnout in the 2004 
parliament election. Robust standard errors clustered at the state assembly constituency level are 
reported in brackets. **, * and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
respectively. Since voters belonging to a ST parliament constituency and voters belonging to a 
ST assembly constituency inside a non-ST parliament constituency are excluded, the number of 












   
 
  
Table 6. Political Reservation and Party Choice 
(Regression Discontinuity: RD) 
Voter’s category: 
SC Non-SC  Other  Hindu  OBC 
Choosing the party (ref.=BJP)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
INC if in SC constituency  0.128  -0.037  -0.089  -0.187 
[0.310] [0.181]  [0.320]  [0.226] 
BSP if in SC constituency  -0.061 -0.657*  -2.483*  -0.735 
[0.374] [0.372]  [1.351]  [0.488] 
Others if in SC constituency -0.100 0.222  -2.483*  0.195 
[0.278] [0.166]  [1.351]  [0.200] 
Number of observations  1,553  7,739  2,617  3,121 
Notes: RD coefficients to identify the reservation impact are reported in this table. Regressions 
also include the population share of SCs (linear, quadratic, and cubic terms), state fixed effects, 
the literacy rate, the population share of rural residents and the population share of workers in 
each industrial category. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of party choice in the 
2004 parliamentary elections and the estimated model is a multinomial logit. Robust standard 
errors clustered at the parliamentary constituency level are reported in brackets. **, * and + 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. The sample is 










     
 
       
   
 
       











Table 7. Political Reservation and Party Choice 
(Difference-in-Difference: DID) 
(1) Comparison of SC vs. non-SC  (2) Comparison of SC, other Hindu, 
voters  OBC and other voters 
INC BSP  Others  INC BSP  Others 
SC const. * SC voter  0.008 0.347 -0.168 0.141 0.770 -0.022 
dummy  [0.296] [0.393] [0.257] [0.395] [0.588] [0.334] 
SC const. * other  0.362  -0.849  0.222 
Hindu dummy  [0.376]  [1.136]  [0.356] 
SC const. * OBC  0.056  0.816  0.197 
dummy  [0.306]  [0.622]  [0.273] 
Notes: DID coefficients to identify the reservation impact are reported in this table. Regressions 
also include the dummy for a SC parliament constituency, the dummy for a SC voter, the 
dummy for other Hindu voter (spec. (2) only), the dummy for OBC voter (spec. (2) only), state 
fixed effects, the literacy rate, the population share of rural residents, and the population share 
of workers in each industrial category. The dependent variable is an indicator variable of party 
choice in the 2004 parliamentary elections and the estimated model is a multinomial logit (the 
choice of BJP as the reference). Robust standard errors clustered at the parliamentary 
constituency level are reported in brackets. **, * and + denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels respectively. The sample is restricted to voters in a constituency where the 





   
 
 








   
 







Reporting Bias and Constituency Characteristics 

Hausman et al. (1998) examine the effect of misclassification of the binary dependent 
variable on statistical inference using discrete-response models. In our context, if the turnout 
response is subject to over-reporting at the rate of α and the misclassification probability is 
independent of explanatory variables, then the slope coefficients in the linear probability model 
have bias, which is proportional to 1-α. However, both of our RD and DID tests are focused on 
testing the equality of one and another of the slope coefficients. These tests are unbiased if α is 
independent of all explanatory variables. Therefore, we run a constituency-level regression 
model where the extent of over-reporting is regressed on explanatory variables used in our RD 
and DID regression models. 
The results are shown in the Appendix Table (given below). They firmly demonstrate 
that the magnitude of bias is the same irrespective of the characteristics of a constituency. 
Therefore, the use of NES04 microdata to investigate the causal impact of reservation on voting 
behavior is justified. 
Appendix Table. Reporting Bias and Constituency Characteristics 
Actual Voter Turnout 
– NES04 Voter Turnout 
Population share of SCs (%) 
Population share of STs (%) 
Dummy for a SC constituency 
Dummy for a ST constituency 










Number of observations  393 
R-squared  0.35 
Notes. Standard errors are reported in brackets. The information on actual voter turnout rates 
was taken from the Election Commission of India’s website [http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/index.asp, 
accessed on April 10, 2011]. The NES04 voter turnout rates were calculated using NES04 
microdata. The regression model also includes the literacy rate, the population share of rural 
residents, and the population share of workers in each industrial category. None of the 
coefficients on the explanatory variables are statistically significant. 
37 